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INTRODUCTION 
Jeffrey Bellin’s article, Crime Severity Distinctions and the Fourth 
Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, argues that the 
severity of the crime under investigation ought to be taken into account in 
assessing both the reasonableness of searches and whether a government 
action is a search in the first place.1 In pursuit of this objective, his article 
provides the best attempt to date at dealing with the difficult issue of 
separating serious from not-so serious crimes (he ends up with three 
 
   Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. 
 1.  Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing 
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2011). 
SLOBOGIN_PDF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/24/2012  3:01 PM 
2 IOWA LAW REVIEW BULLETIN [Vol. 97:1 
categories—grave, serious and minor2). He then makes the enticing 
argument that calibrating the degree of Fourth Amendment protection 
according to crime severity would allow courts to provide more protection 
for those suspected of minor crimes because courts will no longer fear that 
such a move will handcuff police investigations of serious crimes. 
My concern is that just the opposite will occur. Rather than starting 
from a baseline of warrants and probable cause for investigations of serious 
crimes and ratcheting protection upward as the targeted crime becomes less 
serious, courts are likely to apply the warrant baseline to minor crimes and 
ratchet protections downward when law enforcement goes after people 
suspected of being terrorists, murderers, rapists and robbers. The 
proposition that the state should be barred from investigating minor 
crimes—which appears to be Professor Bellin’s agenda, at least when the 
investigative technique is perceived as “intrusive”3—will be too hard for 
courts to swallow, because it amounts to judicial crime definition in the 
substantive due process tradition the courts have rejected. At most, courts 
will require the full complement of probable cause and a warrant in such 
situations. At the same time, if reasonableness analysis incorporates a crime 
severity component as Professor Bellin proposes, courts will inevitably relax 
those requirements in a wide array of investigations, probably involving 
intermediate, “serious” crimes as well as “grave” crimes (to use Professor 
Bellin’s categories). 
Professor Bellin’s worry about government over-reaching during 
investigations of minor crimes is well-taken, however, especially in an age of 
expanded technological surveillance capacity. While his proposal is one way 
of grappling with that problem, more traditional, less risky, methods exist 
for handling it. In particular, enforcing already-existing search incident and 
particularity doctrine, limiting consent and pretext as a basis for searches, 
and explicitly recognizing a narrowly-limited-danger exception would go far 
toward accomplishing the goal that seems to be the primary motivation 
behind Professor Bellin’s article. 
THE ADMINISTRABILITY PROBLEM 
Professor Bellin is correct in asserting that the main reason the courts 
have adhered to a “trans-substantive” Fourth Amendment, the term the late 
William Stuntz coined to describe current search and seizure law,4 is the 
concern that a contrary position would immerse judges in frustrating 
 
 2.  Id. at 27. 
 3.  See infra text accompanying notes 25–27. 
 4.  William J. Stuntz, Essay, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002) 
(“[M]ost constitutional limits on policing are transsubstantive—they apply equally to suspected 
drug dealers and suspected terrorists.”). 
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litigation over when a crime is severe.5 Professor Bellin does as good job as 
possible at laying that concern to rest. He proposes the tripartite 
organization noted above, with crimes of violence occupying the grave crime 
category, victimless crimes like jaywalking, vagrancy, simple assault, and drug 
possession comprising the minor crime category, and everything else 
constituting serious crime.6 
Of course, one can question whether these categories can be contained 
in any meaningful way. For instance, Professor Bellin states that a kick to the 
shin should be in a lower category than an assault involving a stabbing, but 
notes a court decision declaring that even a shin-kick is a major crime and 
does not himself indicate whether he thinks the kick is minor or serious or 
whether the stabbing is serious or grave.7 The same research he cites for the 
proposition that consensus exists as to the ordinal ranking of “core” crimes 
like homicide and assault also finds that for crimes outside the core—which 
include, notably, drug crimes, prostitution, and petty theft by a recidivist—
there is widespread disagreement as to relative seriousness.8 
When one adds Professor Bellin’s suggestion that the category of crime 
involved in a particular case depends on what a “reasonable” police officer 
would believe,9 the potential for mischief vastly increases, given officers’ well-
known penchant for shading the facts when necessary to nab a guilty 
person.10 This becomes a particular problem in cases like Whren v. United 
States, where the cops suspected a drug crime but only had probable cause 
for a traffic violation.11 Professor Bellin’s crime severity test, which focuses 
on “the most serious offense plausibly suggested by the facts known to the 
officer,”12 would presumably permit the more serious drug offense to govern 
a court’s analysis in such a case. Professor Bellin might respond that even a 
drug offense is “minor,” so no quandary exists. But on the facts of Whren an 
officer could “plausibly” assert (and back up with relevant “facts”) that the 
 
 5.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 13 (“In the few cases where the Court explicitly rejects calls to 
consider offense severity, however, its emphasis has been on administrability.”). 
 6.  Id. at 32–33. 
 7.  Id. at 25, 34. 
 8.  Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1885 tbl.6 (2007). 
 9.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 34 & n.138, 43. 
 10.  See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1037, 1041–48 (1996). 
 11.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). The officers saw two individuals in a car 
in a “high drug area” and when the driver saw them (the police) he looked down into his 
passenger Whren’s lap, remained stationary at a stop sign for an abnormally long time (twenty 
seconds), and then, when the police executed a U-turn to come behind them, took off at an 
“unreasonable” rate of speed. Id. at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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defendants were drug traffickers, not just possessors of a few ounces of 
marijuana.13 
If crime severity needs to be measured, however, Professor Bellin’s 
three categories are probably the best we can do without complicating 
matters beyond repair. And since much of the rest of Fourth Amendment 
law depends upon what a reasonable officer believes,14 that part of Professor 
Bellin’s test is at least solidly based on precedent. Courts will have a hard 
time measuring crime severity and developing bright-line rules that provide 
meaningful guidance for the police, especially if, as Professor Bellin believes, 
“reasonableness should carry the day” when clarity and reasonableness 
conflict.15 But the difficulty here is no greater than the difficulty of 
developing rules about relative intrusiveness, which are already a significant 
part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.16 
THE NORMATIVE ARGUMENT AGAINST A CRIME SEVERITY COMPONENT 
Let us assume that we can conquer the administrability problem. 
Professor Bellin rightly notes that “intuition,” bolstered by the comments of 
several justices and (my) empirical research investigating the views of the 
public, could support a reasonableness analysis that takes into account the 
seriousness of the crime under investigation.17 And he is also correct that, 
outside of the administrability complaint, the Supreme Court has failed to 
provide an explicit explanation for its contrary, essentially trans-substantive, 
approach to the Fourth Amendment.18 But none of this means that such an 
explanation cannot be advanced. 
The normative argument was implicit in Mincey v. Arizona, where the 
Supreme Court refused to adopt a “murder scene exception” that would 
have allowed warrantless searches of a home in all suspected murder cases, 
 
 13.  Indeed, the police found in Whren’s lap “two large plastic bags of what appeared to 
be crack cocaine.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 809. 
 14.  See, e.g., id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis.”). 
 15.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 39. 
 16.  See Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and 
Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1595 (2010) (noting that “intrusiveness” or “invasiveness” is 
found in over 200 Supreme Court Fourth Amendment opinions (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 17.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 4 (“A key intuitive component of reasonableness is the 
seriousness of the crime investigated”); id. at 18 & n.68 (quoting from Justice Jackson’s dissent 
in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949), the statement that “if we are to make 
judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment . . . it seems to me they should depend [instead] 
upon the gravity of the offense”); id. at 45 & n.183 (noting the results of a survey of laypeople 
described in Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 767 (1993), and finding that “the privacy expectations 
that society would deem reasonable fluctuate with crime severity”). 
 18.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 13. 
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regardless of whether exigency existed.19 The Court’s main concern in 
Mincey was, as Professor Bellin states, the proverbial slippery slope.20 But in 
answer to the state’s claim that murder investigations should be relatively 
unrestricted, Justice Stewart’s opinion in Mincey also forthrightly stated that 
“the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never 
by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.”21 In other words, the 
government may not dispense with a warrant requirement simply because 
obtaining a warrant might impede a murder investigation. Otherwise, a 
person’s Fourth Amendment protections will diminish whenever the police 
believe (however reasonably) a serious crime has been committed. 
I have argued elsewhere that the latter result is analogous to lowering 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt proof requirement at trial whenever the 
alleged crime is serious.22 Professor Bellin contends that this analogy is 
“flawed” because the state’s heightened interest in obtaining a conviction in 
such cases is offset by “the innocent defendant’s interest in avoiding a more 
serious conviction.”23 But the individual whose house is invaded by police in 
the erroneous belief that he is a murderer also has much more to lose, in 
terms of both reputation and emotional stability, than the innocent 
individual whose home is searched upon suspicion of drug possession. 
The most potent normative argument in favor of a trans-substantive 
amendment, however, is based on the likely outcome of a rule incorporating 
crime severity into reasonableness analysis. Although Professor Bellin never 
quite says so, he suggests that arrests in traffic cases like Atwater v. Lago 
Vista24 (the soccer mom case) and various stops and searches connected with 
other “minor” crimes would not be permitted in his regime.25 And he 
explicitly argues that searches of homes (at least via surreptitious video 
camera) for evidence of crimes like cable theft or marijuana possession 
should be prohibited.26 Finally, he seems comfortable with a grave crime 
 
 19.  Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
 20.  Id. at 393 (“‘No consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point 
of rational limitation’ of such a doctrine.” (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 
(1969))). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 16, at 1614. 
 23.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 15 n.55. 
 24.  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 25.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 36 (“The alternative approach proposed here would allow the 
suspect in a case like Atwater to invoke an exception to the per se rule based on the ‘minor’ 
nature of her underlying offense. Her seizure could then be individually analyzed in light of its 
intrusiveness and the public interest furthered to determine Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness.”); id. at 20 (“Currently valid searches and seizures would become 
unconstitutional due, in part, to the relative insignificance of the targeted offense.”). 
 26.  Id. at 43 (“[W]here police are targeting ‘minor crimes,’ video surveillance and other 
technological techniques “should be deemed per se unreasonable and no warrant would issue.”). 
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exception to the warrant requirement akin to that rejected in Mincey.27 All of 
this could easily lead to disaster, at least for those who want a strong Fourth 
Amendment. 
First, contrary to Professor Bellin’s apparent hope, courts are highly 
unlikely to ban arrests or searches simply because the crime at issue is 
“minor.” Rather, as long as the police action is not extremely intrusive, at 
most they will require full Fourth Amendment protection in such cases. 
Even Welsh v. Wisconsin, the lone Supreme Court case that directly supports 
Professor Bellin’s approach,28 only prohibited warrantless home entries in 
cases involving minor crime; the Court would have allowed the search of 
Welsh’s home had the police obtained a warrant29 (which in these days of 
telephonic warrants is very possible even in the short time the police had to 
obtain a sample of Welsh’s blood while he was still intoxicated30). Fourth 
Amendment rules that make pursuing minor crimes very difficult would 
amount to a judicial declaration that criminalizing certain actions is 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has been willing to use the Due 
Process Clause for this purpose when vague laws allow easy abuse of police 
discretion.31 But venturing beyond those cases to, in effect, strike down 
“minor” laws that are not unconstitutionally vague—for instance, traffic laws 
that might give police a pretext for consent or search incident searches, or 
drug laws that might provide police with an excuse to access cell phones, 
computers, or homes—is not a step courts are likely to take.32 That move 
 
 27.  Id. at 36–37 (“An analogous approach, favoring law enforcement, could be applied in 
cases like Mincey, where a bright-line rule forbidding certain actions would yield in an 
investigation of a grave offense.”). 
 28.  In Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, the Court is likely to strike down a policy 
allowing a strip search of jail inmates charged with minor crimes, but presumably that holding 
is best conceptualized as a statement that suspicion of weaponry or contraband is required for 
such strip searches, not as a declaration that all jail inmates charged with minor crimes are 
exempt from the policy. 621 F.3d 296 (2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011). 
 29.  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
 30.  Bryan D. Lane, Telephonic Search Warrants Under the Oregon Constitution: A Call for the 
Limitation of Exigent Circumstances, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 967, 982 (1988) (reporting that, by 
one estimate, in San Diego 95% of telephonic warrant requests “were processed in less than 
forty-five minutes”). 
 31.  See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 47, 64 (1999) (striking down an 
ordinance that criminalized “loitering” by or with a gang members after failing to disperse 
when requested to do so by police). 
 32.  Cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 n.9 (1985) (“Absent any suggestion that 
the [school] rule violates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts should, as a 
general matter, defer to that judgment and refrain from attempting to distinguish between 
rules that are important to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not.”). Of 
course, legislatures can impose crime-related limitations on the police, as has occurred with 
regulation of electronic surveillance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2006) (limiting interception 
warrants to certain felonies). 
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would trench too obviously on legislative power and police ability to sniff out 
more serious crime.33 
If all but the most intrusive actions designed to get evidence about 
minor crimes can take place pursuant to a warrant and probable cause, then 
under Professor Bellin’s reasonableness approach searches for evidence of 
serious and grave crimes will be permissible on something less than that. 
The Supreme Court has already demonstrated its willingness to make this 
move in connection with national security investigations, where it has 
seriously watered down both the warrant and probable cause 
requirements.34 Professor Bellin provides another example with his 
description of United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing.35 There the Ninth 
Circuit panel crafted a number of reasonable restrictions designed to 
prevent the police from using a warrant authorizing a computer search as a 
license to search through every file in the computer; the panel’s goal was to 
ensure the government only saw, or at least only retained, items for which 
and files about whom it had ex ante probable cause to search.36 But the 
government’s subsequent complaints about this holding, based primarily on 
the assertion that the panel’s rules would circumscribe investigations of 
rapists and terrorists, led to reversal of the decision by the full court.37 Along 
the same lines, both judges and scholars have explicitly argued that Fourth 
Amendment standards should be lowered or not subject to the exclusionary 
remedy in connection with investigations of serious crime.38 Once a crime 
severity exception to “normal” protections is recognized, the government 
 
 33.  It might also create perverse incentives. See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, 
Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 570–72 (1992) (arguing that 
if school officials were stymied by strict cause requirements they would exercise other, more 
intrusive powers—suspensions, hall and bathroom monitors, etc.—to accomplish their goal of 
enforcing order). 
 34.  United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322–23 (1972) (“Different standards 
may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the 
legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our 
citizens.”). This authority has led to a special warrant process for foreign intelligence 
investigations that reduces the probable cause showing when national security is a “significant” 
purpose of the investigation. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2006). 
 35.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 42–43. 
 36.  United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 
2009) (“The process of segregating electronic data that is seizable from that which is not must 
not become a vehicle for the government to gain access to data which it has no probable cause 
to collect.”), revised and superseded by 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 37. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 38.  See, e.g., State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 529–31 (Ariz. 1984) (arguing that the 
exclusionary rule should apply only when the illegality committed by the police outweighs the 
gravity of the suspected crime); Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 951, 962–63 (2009) (suggesting that a ten percent chance of finding evidence of crime is 
sufficient if the crime is serious); William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and 
the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 849 (2001) (“When investigating 
murder suspects . . . , the standard should probably be lower, not higher.”). 
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can be expected to press it routinely and aggressively and courts, as 
Professor Bellin notes,39 will find resistance very difficult. 
The message that will eventually percolate down to police in such a 
regime is that the Fourth Amendment is not meant to impose significant 
constraints on investigations of serious crimes. As Yale Kamisar wrote in 
criticizing a proposal to exempt serious crime investigations from 
application of the exclusionary rule, police will come to believe that “[i]n 
the big cases the fourth amendment is too great an impediment in the war 
against crime for law enforcement officials to endure.”40 Research indicates 
that police already cut corners when serious crime is the target.41 Even many 
judges appear to have adopted this attitude, at least in connection with 
“terrorism” investigations since September 9, 2011.42 Professor Bellin’s 
regime likely ensures that when the goal is to nab a murderer, armed 
robber, or rapist, the police will increasingly take liberties, and those 
responsible for regulating them will increasingly turn a blind eye to their 
behavior. 
THE SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION AND CRIME SEVERITY 
As one example of the possible benefits his approach could reap, 
Professor Bellin points to the Supreme Court’s special needs cases, which 
have relied on reasonableness analysis in abandoning both the warrant and 
probable cause requirements in a host of administrative search situations.43 
Because these cases usually involve investigation of relatively minor crimes 
and sometimes of behavior that is not a crime at all (e.g., violation of school 
anti-smoking rules, drug use by railway workers), Professor Bellin suggests 
that his approach would counter the Court’s penchant for relaxing Fourth 
Amendment rules in these situations.44 Although, again, Professor Bellin 
does not make entirely clear how he would regulate these searches, one gets 
 
 39.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 46 (“Judges, like all of us, prefer that law enforcement employ 
all of its resources—where ‘reasonable’ —to combat the most grave crimes.”). 
 40.  Yale Kamisar, “Comparative Reprehensibility” and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 
86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1987). 
 41.  See Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 927–
28 (2009) (describing two studies, one involving wiretaps and the other searches for drugs, 
indicating that police assertions of probable cause are more likely to be wrong when the target 
is serious crime). 
 42.  See, e.g., Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 82 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding, per Judge 
Sotomayor, suspicionless searches on New York’s ferry system because “[p]reventing or 
deterring large-scale terrorist attacks present problems that are distinct from standard law 
enforcement needs and indeed go well beyond them”). As argued below, see infra text 
accompanying notes 68–76, I agree with this sentiment, if not the precise holding in Cassidy, 
but only because it focuses on prevention rather than gathering evidence of already-committed 
crime. 
 43.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
 44.  Id. at 35 (“[A] search to enforce the school dress code is not as important as the same 
search to investigate a violent crime, and the doctrine should reflect that intuition.”). 
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the sense that he would not permit them when they are “intrusive.” As he 
puts it in the school search context, “[w]hether a school official conducts a 
strip search of a student or monitors students electronically (intercepting e-
mail, videotaping school bathrooms, or via GPS tracking), a court evaluating 
the constitutionality of that search should weigh its intrusiveness against the 
public interest.”45 But outside of strip searches (which the Court has already 
held are only permitted in special needs cases when they would be permitted 
outside the special needs context46), what types of school regulatory searches 
are so intrusive that they would be banned by his approach? If interception 
of e-mail is prohibited, will searches of desks and purses, which are arguably 
just as intrusive, also be banned?47 
Perhaps the result of Professor Bellin’s approach is merely that 
probable cause should be required in the latter situations. I agree with that 
result on the straightforward ground that these searches are intrusive 
enough to require probable cause.48 Professor Bellin’s additional rationale—
that greater cause is required because the government’s goal is only 
regulatory—creates another dilemma, however. The Court has strongly 
implied that the quasi-civil nature of these investigations is actually a reason 
for reducing the justification required to carry them out, on the not 
unreasonable ground that the consequence of a successful investigation for 
its target is relatively insignificant.49 Others have explicitly relied on that 
rationale in justifying fewer restrictions on special needs searches.50 Once 
the trans-substantive orientation is jettisoned, in other words, the fact that 
 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009) (holding that 
reasonable suspicion is insufficient grounds for exploring students’ undergarments). 
 47.  The Court has upheld searches of employee desks and student purses on less than 
probable cause. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987) (employee desks); New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–43 (1985) (school student’s purse). 
 48.  See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
65–68 (1991) (arguing for a probable cause standard in these situations if they are of 
“comparable intrusiveness” to law-enforcement searches). 
 49.  See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 729 n.* (“[W]e do not address the appropriate standard 
when an employee is being investigated for criminal misconduct or breaches of other nonwork-
related statutory or regulatory standards.”); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7 (“We here consider only 
searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority. This case 
does not present the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches 
conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, 
and we express no opinion on that question.” (citing Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 
1219–21 (N.D. Ill. 1976))); see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294–95 (1984) (holding 
that search of a burned-down house for evidence of arson requires a warrant but that otherwise 
such a search only requires notice or an administrative warrant). 
 50.  See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 
DUKE L.J. 843, 920 (2010) (calling “perfectly sensible” the suspension of an individualized 
suspicion requirement in situations where the search is for something other than evidence to 
be used in a criminal prosecution). 
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the government’s target is minor crime rather than grave crime could well 
lead courts to a result directly contrary to Professor Bellin’s preferences. 
TECHNOLOGY AND CRIME SEVERITY MODULATION 
A second benefit Professor Bellin believes follows from his approach is 
the restriction he thinks it would impose on government’s ability to use its 
rapidly expanding technological surveillance capacity in aid of minor crime 
investigations. But that benefit is likely to be minimal. Most of the minor 
crimes that Professor Bellin identifies—his entire list consists of jaywalking, 
riding a bicycle on the sidewalk, traffic and regulatory offenses, truancy, 
vagrancy, illegal gambling, trespassing, public drunkenness, noise 
disturbances, drug possession, simple assault, petty theft, and 
prostitution51—do not require or even tempt use of technological 
surveillance of a home or other protected area in order to get evidence. 
More importantly, for reasons discussed above, on those few occasions when 
such surveillance is requested—perhaps in connection with drug possession 
or illegal gambling—the most likely judicial response is to require a warrant, 
not ban such surveillance altogether. 
Professor Bellin also makes an intriguing observation in connection 
with technologically enhanced investigative techniques that are currently 
not considered searches (e.g., public GPS surveillance and data mining) and 
thus would never require a warrant or any level of individualized suspicion 
under current law. He suggests that, under his proposal, such techniques 
could be said to cross the Fourth Amendment threshold when they are 
directed at solving minor crimes.52 The problem with this approach is that it 
would transform a technique that is not a search when used to investigate a 
serious crime into a search when minor crime is the target. That interpretive 
manipulation might make sense if one could say that reasonable 
expectations of privacy—the current test for the Fourth Amendment’s 
threshold53—differ depending upon whether one is engaging in drug 
possession or terrorist activities. But that interpretation conflates the 
threshold inquiry with the justification inquiry. Put another way, it flows 
from the perspective of a target who is known to be guilty of a particular 
crime. Yet, as the Supreme Court has made clear, the correct perspective for 
evaluating Fourth Amendment interests is that of a target who has done 
nothing wrong.54 From that perspective, long-term or intense surveillance is 
 
 51.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 32. 
 52.  Id. at 46 (“[A] court grappling with the question of whether an investigative 
technique constitutes a ‘search,’ could plausibly consider the severity of the crime under 
investigation.”). 
 53.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 54.  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (“[T]he potential intrusiveness of the 
officers’ conduct must be judged from the viewpoint of an innocent person in [the target’s] 
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similarly intrusive whether the police say they are seeking drugs or bombs. If 
anything, as noted above, the government is probably acting more 
intrusively in the latter situation. 
A BETTER APPROACH 
None of this is meant to deny two of Professor Bellin’s core assertions: 
First, that the government routinely abuses its power in connection with 
investigation of minor crimes, and second, that technological advances are 
likely to exacerbate those abuses unless courts are more attentive to Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness analysis. My primary contention is simply that 
adopting a crime severity gloss on that analysis in an effort to handle these 
problems will backfire. Under Professor Bellin’s proposal, unless extreme 
investigative techniques are at issue courts will not change their regulation 
of minor crime investigation, yet they will use crime severity as an excuse for 
minimizing protections in all other situations. A better approach is to 
encourage judicial adherence to traditional trans-substantive Fourth 
Amendment principles that can curb government discretion in a more 
nuanced and less risky fashion. 
Professor Bellin’s article looks at both traditional and technologically-
enhanced investigations. The major source of police harassment in 
traditional investigations of minor crimes cases is the use of street stops and 
traffic infractions as a pretext to gain consent to search, find evidence of 
crime in “plain view,” or conduct a search incident to arrest.55 Prohibiting or 
discouraging government use of these stop and arrest powers even when 
they flow from good faith efforts to enforce drug possession, traffic 
violations, and other low-level prohibitions that are not unconstitutionally 
vague, which is the effect of Professor Bellin’s proposal, is too drastic. 
Instead, courts should strictly enforce three traditional Fourth Amendment 
doctrines: (1) the reasonable suspicion and probable cause requirements; 
(2) the rule that consents be voluntary; and (3) the search incident to arrest 
rationale of protecting officers and preventing evidence destruction.56 While 
the current Court has been less than vigorous in enforcing the first two 
rules, taken seriously they would impose meaningful limitations on police 
 
position.” (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 55.  See generally David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1, 22–32 (1994) (describing abuse of stop-and-frisk authority); Illya Lichtenberg, Police 
Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of Men?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 425 (2002–03) 
(describing police discretion during traffic stops). 
 56.  For a discussion of these doctrines, see CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER 
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 5.03 (5th ed. 2008) 
(probable cause); id. § 11.03(a) (reasonable suspicion); id. § 12.02 (voluntariness of consent); 
and id. § 6.04 (scope of search incident rule). 
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power in connection with investigating minor crimes.57 And even the 
current Court has shown signs of reinvigorating restrictions on search 
incident to arrest doctrine with its decision in Arizona v. Gant forbidding 
searches of cars when the offense of arrest is a mere traffic violation that is 
unlikely to involve danger to the officers or evidence.58 An analogous “frisk 
incident to stop” doctrine would similarly prevent pretextual or overbroad 
patdowns. 
The primary threat posed by technological surveillance lies in its 
potential for vastly expanding government capacity to monitor public and 
private activity more cheaply, thus enabling surveillance for prolonged 
periods of time and over large segments of the populace. The hope among 
privacy advocates is that the Supreme Court will ultimately follow the 
suggestion made by five of its members in its recent decision in United States 
v. Jones and hold that, even when focused solely on public activities, long-
term surveillance is a Fourth Amendment search.59 One disincentive for 
doing so, as Professor Bellin alertly notes, is the real possibility that such a 
decision would handcuff police investigations of serious crimes, a 
disincentive that, he says, would disappear if the Fourth Amendment were 
not interpreted as trans-substantive.60 But a trans-substantive solution to this 
dilemma is also possible. As I have argued elsewhere, an intrusion-centered 
proportionality approach—in other words, an approach that aligns the 
justification for a search with its intrusiveness—would reduce the cause 
 
 57.  See, e.g., Harris, supra note 55, at 48–52 (proposing a more restrictive stop-and-frisk 
authority); Arnold H. Loewy, Knowing “Consent” Means “Knowing Consent”: The Underappreciated 
Wisdom of Justice Marshall’s Schneckloth v. Bustamonte Dissent, 79 MISS. L.J. 97, 106–07 (2009) 
(proposing a more stringent voluntariness test in consent cases). 
 58.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a 
recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest.”); see also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (prohibiting 
searches incident to arrest for “non-custodial” crimes). 
 59.  United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, 2012 WL 171117, at *9 (Jan. 23, 2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their 
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to 
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”); id. 
at *17 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”). 
 60.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 46. As indicated supra note 59, Justice Alito’s opinion in Jones 
does suggest that the Fourth Amendment should not apply to tracking in connection with 
investigation of “extraordinary” offenses. Jones, 2012 WL 171117, at *17. Since he defines that 
term no further, Justice Alito may have in mind the type of investigation that would be covered 
by the danger exception described below. But it is also worth noting that Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion in Jones stated that “[t]here is no precedent for the proposition that whether a 
search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being investigated.” Id. at *7 (majority 
opinion). 
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necessary to carry out less intrusive searches such as public surveillance.61 A 
proportionality regime would go a long way toward eliminating judicial 
concern about declaring preliminary investigative actions “searches.” For 
instance, tracking, at least tracking that is not prolonged, could be justified 
on reasonable suspicion, and large-scale data mining could be justified on 
similar grounds.62 If the latter approach is adopted (which is not out of the 
question63), courts need not take the additional step of modulating 
reasonableness analysis through a crime severity framework that renders the 
Fourth Amendment irrelevant to preliminary investigative steps in serious 
cases. 
The type of technological surveillance that is of most concern, Professor 
Bellin rightly recognizes, is surveillance of the home using hidden cameras, 
thermal imagers, magnification devices or other detection devices. Professor 
Bellin conjures up the possibility that the government will eventually end up 
planting cameras in people’s homes even in low level drug and cable theft 
investigations.64 Assuming it wants to divert its resources doing so, such 
surveillance would of course need to be based on a warrant. Under Title III 
(and consistent with proportionality reasoning, given the intrusiveness of 
the search), such a warrant would only issue upon probable cause and a 
showing that the evidence could not be obtained in some less intrusive 
manner.65 Furthermore, the particularity and execution limitations on 
warrants would not permit prolonged surveillance for such simple crimes.66 
For instance, in the case described by Professor Bellin in which a school 
tracked down a laptop thief by activating the laptop’s camera to scan his 
home,67 not only would a warrant be needed (apparently none was 
obtained) but, once the camera was activated and the culprit identified 
(which would presumably take place within seconds), the surveillance would 
have to stop. Professor Bellin would instead prohibit use of technology in 
this way; the alternative, however, is either to forgo the investigation or to 
 
 61.  CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 210–11 (2007). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Cf. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 n.5 (1984) (refusing to decide whether a 
court order authorizing beeper tracking of a can of ether inside the home could be based on 
reasonable suspicion). 
 64.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 41. 
 65.  18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (2006) (requiring the magistrate issuing a Title III warrant 
for surveillance to find that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous”). 
 66.  Id. § 2518(1)(b)(iii), (4)(c)–(e), (5) (requiring, inter alia, that a surveillance warrant 
describe “the type of communications sought to be intercepted . . . a statement of the particular 
offense to which it relates [and] . . . the period of time during which such interception is 
authorized”, and also requiring that the interception “be conducted in such a way as to 
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception”). 
 67.  Bellin, supra note 1, at 3–4, 43. 
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engage in undercover activity, interrogation, or some other investigative 
technique that might be at least as intrusive and, if Title III is followed, 
would be more intrusive or risky by definition. 
THE DANGER EXCEPTION 
In other work, I have argued against the type of crime severity analysis 
that Professor Bellin proposes.68 However, I have also argued that one type 
of crime-specific exception to the normal Fourth Amendment requirements 
is clearly permissible under both the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents 
and legal principles established in other settings.69 When a government 
search is aimed at preventing a significant, imminent, and specific threat then 
it need not meet the ordinary justification requirements. This “danger 
exception,” as I call it, would alleviate to some extent the pressure courts feel 
when prosecutors make handcuffing arguments. 
The danger exception can be seen at work in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Terry v. Ohio,70 which permits both stops and frisks on the lesser, 
reasonable suspicion ground in part because of the need to provide police 
with a mechanism both for snuffing out crime before it occurs and for 
protecting themselves and other members of the public. As Chief Justice 
Warren stated for the Court “[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to 
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police 
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and 
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest 
the individual for a crime.”71 This prevention rationale for relaxing Fourth 
Amendment standards can be found in a number of other Supreme Court 
Fourth Amendment opinions.72 It also underlies the Court’s decisions 
permitting preventive detention on clear and convincing evidence rather 
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.73 
Consistent with Terry, the danger exception as I conceive it would apply 
only when the threat is specific and imminent. Furthermore, I agree with 
Professor Bellin that intrusive actions designed to prevent danger should be 
permitted only if the danger is significant. This danger exception would 
 
 68.  See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 16, at 1611–14. 
 69.  SLOBOGIN, supra note 61, at 26–28. 
 70.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
 71.  Id. at 27. 
 72.  See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006) (permitting warrantless 
entry into a home when there is an “objectively reasonable basis” to believe an assault is 
imminent); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336–37 (1990) (permitting a protective sweep of 
premises upon reasonable suspicion that a confederate is on premises). Contra United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (upholding stops based on reasonable suspicion of past as 
well as ongoing and future crime, at least when the crime is serious). 
 73.  See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
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permit Justice Jackson’s kidnapper roadblock,74 as well as the Court’s oft-
cited hypothetical anti-terrorism checkpoint,75 and the use of deadly force in 
situations approved by Tennessee v. Garner.76 It would also allow some, but 
not all, of the government’s national security investigations to take place on 
less than probable cause and perhaps without a warrant as well, depending 
upon the exigencies. In other words, it would permit a reduction in Fourth 
Amendment requirements in many of the situations that Professor Bellin 
identifies as reasons we need the crime severity safety valve. But it would not 
allow relaxation of the Fourth Amendment in investigations of past crime 
simply because a reasonable officer could label the crime grave or serious. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Bellin makes the best possible case for incorporating crime 
severity into reasonableness analysis. If we could be sure it would operate in 
the way he suggests—with the baseline requirement consisting of a warrant 
and probable cause for the investigation of serious crimes—then there 
would be much to recommend it. But since that guarantee is not possible in 




 74.  See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting), noted 
in Bellin, supra note 1, at 18. 
 75.  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart 
an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a 
particular route.”). 
 76.  Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), noted in Bellin, supra note 1, at 32. 
